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To understand transmission of avian influenza A
(H5N1) virus, we conducted a retrospective survey of poul-
try deaths and a seroepidemiologic investigation in a
Cambodian village where a 28-year-old man was infected
with H5N1 virus in March 2005. Poultry surveys were con-
ducted within a 1-km radius of the patient’s household.
Forty-two household flocks were considered likely to have
been infected from January through March 2005 because
>60% of the flock died, case-fatality ratio was 100%, and
both young and mature birds died within 1 to 2 days. Two
sick chickens from a property adjacent to the patient’s
house tested positive for H5N1 on reverse transcription–
PCR. Villagers were asked about poultry exposures in the
past year and tested for H5N1 antibodies. Despite frequent,
direct contact with poultry suspected of having H5N1 virus
infection, none of 351 participants from 93 households had
neutralizing antibodies to H5N1. H5N1 virus transmission
from poultry to humans remains low in this setting.
F
rom its identification in poultry in the People’s
Republic of China in 1996 and outbreak among com-
mercial farms and live poultry markets in Hong Kong in
1997 (1), highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1)
virus has become an unprecedented epizootic and spread to
domestic poultry and wild bird populations in Asia (2,3),
the Middle East, Europe, and Africa (4). This epizootic has
affected farmers and the agricultural industry, claimed
human lives, and raised the specter of a global influenza
pandemic, perhaps even beyond the scale of the devastat-
ing 1918 “Spanish” influenza pandemic (5).
In Cambodia, highly pathogenic H5N1 was first report-
ed in poultry in January 2004 (6). Of 92 poultry outbreaks
that year, 15 were confirmed by isolation of H5N1 viruses
(7). During the first 4 months of 2005, 4 fatal human H5N1
cases were detected in Kampot Province, southeast
Cambodia (8). These human cases occurred contempora-
neously with unreported outbreaks of high deaths among
chicken flocks throughout Kampot Province. However,
H5N1 virus was confirmed in both a person and poultry in
only 1 area of Kampot Province, a village in Banteay Meas
District, ≈20 km from the Vietnam border and 15 km from
the household of the first confirmed human H5N1 case-
patient in Cambodia.
The patient from Banteay Meas District was a 28-year-
old male farmer in whom a low-grade fever and dizziness
developed on March 17, 2005. Approximately 1 week
before he became sick, chickens at his home suddenly
began dying. His family reported that he plucked at least 1
chicken and ate poultry that had died of illness suggestive
of H5N1 disease. He may also have collected dead birds.
On the third day of his illness, nonproductive cough, short-
ness of breath, and watery diarrhea developed. Two days
later, he was transported to a Phnom Penh hospital. His
condition rapidly deteriorated, and he died the next day
despite mechanical ventilation and inotropic support. H5N1
virus infection was confirmed by reverse transcriptase
(RT)–PCR from blood; tracheal aspirates; and nasophar-
ynx, throat, and rectal swab specimens collected during his
hospitalization (Institut Pasteur – Cambodia, unpub. data).
The farmer’s rural village provided a setting in which
we could study the epidemiologic features of H5N1 virus
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Methods
Retrospective Poultry Death Survey
We conducted an immediate investigation in response to
notification of the confirmed human H5N1 case in Banteay
Meas District. From March 25 through 27, 2005, all house-
holds located within a radius of 1 km from the H5N1 case-
patient’s household were mapped and positioned with a
hand-held global positioning system (Garmin, Olathe, KS,
USA). We collected information on illness suggestive of
H5N1 among animals in each household by interviewing
the head of the family with a standardized questionnaire.
Households where the head of the family was not at home
or could not be found were omitted.
A household chicken flock was considered likely to
have been infected by H5N1 virus during the previous 6
months if all of the following characteristics were report-
ed: flock death >60%, 100% case-fatality ratio, and sudden
death of young and mature birds within 1 or 2 days of
becoming sick. We collected sick poultry and carcasses for
H5N1 virus testing. Cloacal swabs of 10 to 14 randomly
selected, live, healthy poultry were also collected from
each household where birds remained.
Seroepidemiologic Investigation
We conducted a seroepidemiologic investigation June
3–7, 2005, ≈2 months after the village reported high poul-
try deaths. It consisted of interviews of household mem-
bers with a standardized 39-question questionnaire on
demographic information and data on specific exposures
to animals and the environment during the last 12 months;
a 5-mL venous blood specimen was also collected from
participants. Four investigation teams of 3 members each
visited all households in 4 different directions, starting
from the household of the confirmed human case-patient,
until 300 participants were enrolled in the study. Each
household was visited once, and no further attempts were
made to interview absent adult household members. The
sample size was estimated to have a 95% chance of detect-
ing >1 seropositive person, if one assumes a 2% preva-
lence of H5N1 antibodies in the village. Written informed
consent was obtained from adults or from a parent or
guardian for children <18 years of age. The study was
approved by the Cambodian Ethics Committee.
Laboratory Methods
All animal samples were placed into viral transport
medium in sterile tubes in the field, kept cold, and trans-
ported daily to the National Animal Health Laboratory of
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in
Phnom Penh. Cloacal specimens and organ samples from
sick and dying poultry were tested for influenza A with an
indirect fluorescent antibody assay. Positive results were
forwarded to the virology unit of the Institut Pasteur in
Cambodia for confirmation with real-time RT-PCR to
detect H5 viral RNA. Human blood specimens were cen-
trifuged, and sera were aliquoted and frozen at −80°C. Sera
were shipped on dry ice to the Hong Kong Government
Virus Unit Laboratory for detection of H5N1 neutralizing
antibodies by microneutralization assay and confirmatory
Western blot assay. Serologic evidence of H5N1 virus
infection was defined as an H5N1 neutralizing antibody
titer >80 with a confirmatory Western blot assay (9).
Statistical Analyses
The position codes of all surveyed households were
entered into ArcGIS version 9.0 (ESRI Systems, Redlands,
CA, USA). We used the space-time scan statistic to deter-
mine the cluster of households most likely to have been
affected by H5N1 virus in the previous 6 months. Analysis
was performed with SaTScan version 5.1.3 (10); cases
were assumed to follow a Poisson distribution. The space-
time statistic is defined by a cylindrical window with a cir-
cular geographic base and height pertaining to time. The
window is moved in space and time for each geographic
location and size. We obtained several overlapping cylin-
ders of different sizes and shapes covering the study area;
each cylindrical window reflected a possible cluster. The
most likely cluster is the one least likely to have occurred
by chance, according to the maximum likelihood ratio test
statistic. Individual and household data were entered into
EpiData version 3.02 (EpiData Association, Odense,
Denmark) and validated with a duplicate data file. STATA
version 8.0 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA) was
used for all statistical analyses. Odds ratios were estimated
with bivariate logistic regression. Independent associations
between demographic and behavioral data and households
that were likely to be affected by H5N1 in poultry were
also analyzed by logistic regression models. We accounted
for the cluster effect of households with STATA’s “cluster”
option for logistic regression, which specifies that observa-
tions are independent across households but not within
households. For multivariate analysis, variables with a p
value <0.1 were retained in the models. Selected variables
whose correlation coefficient was >0.4, which indicates
colinearity between these variables, were not included in
the logistic regression model.
These investigations were conducted as a collaborative
effort between the Cambodian Ministry of Health and
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Institut
Pasteur in Cambodia, the World Health Organization,
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Disease Control and Prevention, and the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.
Results
Poultry Deaths in the Village
Of 194 households located within 1 km of the H5N1
patient’s house, 163 (84%) had occupants who were home
at the time of the survey. No household refused to partici-
pate.
Among interviewed households, 155 (95%) raised
chickens (median 20, range 1–80 per household) and 52
(32%) raised ducks (median 4, range 1–50). Fifty house-
holds (31%) reared both ducks and chickens. Sixty-three
households owned pigs (range 1–4 animals). From January
1 through March 26, 2005, 102 (66%) of 155 households
reported deaths of chickens. Of these households, 73
(72%) recorded deaths during the last 4 weeks of this 3-
month period (Figures 1 and 2). The median poultry flock
death ratio was 90% (range 4%–100%). According to our
definition, 42 households were likely to have had an out-
break of H5N1, for an overall attack rate of 27% among
households with chickens. Flock death ratio was >80% in
31 of these households. The initial mean flock size in
households likely to have had H5N1 in chickens was sig-
nificantly larger than in households without chicken deaths
(31 vs. 20, p = 0.003).
Eleven households with a high likelihood of H5N1
(35%) in chickens also owned ducks, although only 2 of
these described simultaneous deaths of ducks: 1 reported a
duck flock death ratio of 80%, the other a ratio of 100%.
Seven other households reported high levels of death
among duck flocks (>60%), but the number of deaths
among chickens did not suggest H5N1. Overall, raising
ducks with chickens was not associated with deaths in
chickens (p = 0.57).
Cloacal swabs were collected from 28 chickens and 14
ducks. Specimens from 2 sick chickens were positive for
H5N1 by RT-PCR. These chickens belonged to a house-
hold located ≈50 m from the household of the confirmed
human H5N1 case-patient. The owner of the sick chickens
reported that the farmer with H5N1 virus infection spent
daylight hours in his compound.
The space-time scan statistic detected a significant clus-
ter of 25 (60%) households with an overall relative risk of
7.9 (log likelihood ratio 34.1, p = 0.001) (Figure 1). The
cluster was confined to the period from February 25
through March 26, with a radius of 444 m, which con-
tained both the household of the confirmed H5N1 case-
patient and the house with the 2 H5N1-infected chickens.
Seroepidemiologic Survey Findings
Among 93 households that were surveyed, 351 persons
participated and 3 refused. An average of 4 people resided
in each household, the median age was 23 years (range 1
month–81 years), and 150 (42.7%) of the sample were
male; 207 (59%) were farmers of both crops and livestock.
The rest of the participants were students (29.3%), had no
stated occupation (18.8%), or were construction or factory
workers (0.9%). Reflecting the rural setting and the com-
mon means of livelihood, ownership of animals, including
poultry, was high (Table 1). The number of households
with chickens decreased by 17.5% (p<0.001) after the out-
break, while the number of households that possessed
ducks and pigs remained similar (−15.7% and 5.7%, p =
0.43 and 0.74, respectively).
Because many households owned poultry or pigs, a
substantial proportion of the surveyed population had reg-
ular, high-intensity contact with these animals in the 12
months before the survey; this contact included collecting,
processing, and eating sick birds or birds that had recently
died when H5N1 viruses were thought to be circulating
among flocks in the village. Despite this finding, none of
the villagers interviewed reported having a febrile or respi-
ratory illness during the same period, and none of the 351
participants had neutralizing antibodies suggestive of
H5N1 virus infection on microneutralization assay.
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Figure 1. Clustering of 25 households with a high likelihood of
avian influenza H5N1 (35%) in chickens, February 27–March 26,
2005, southern Cambodia. White squares indicate visited house-
holds without chicken deaths, and black squares indicate house-
holds with a chicken flock that was probably infected with H5N1
virus. The cluster is indicated by the circle.We compared exposures of residents from households
with a high probability of having had an outbreak of H5N1
in their chicken flock (n = 96) with occupants from house-
holds where no chickens died (n = 166) (Table 1).
Bivariate analysis showed that households that purchased
live poultry in the preceding year were almost 4× more
likely to have had H5N1 in their flock than households that
did not buy live chickens. In contrast, certain behavior by
household members appeared to reduce the risk for H5N1
virus infection in their household flock by half (and the
difference remained significant after controlling for poul-
try purchasing): cleaning cages or stalls, cleaning up poul-
try feathers, and handling live poultry (Table 1).
Slaughtering chickens was not a significant risk factor
after controlling for exposures that were significant on
multivariate analysis (Table 2).
Discussion
The primary finding of our investigations is that trans-
mission of H5N1 viruses from infected poultry to humans
appears to have been low in a rural Cambodian population
with confirmed and suspected H5N1 poultry outbreaks,
and where a human H5N1 case occurred during 2005. This
finding is consistent with other studies that have described
low frequency of H5N1 neutralizing antibody among
healthcare workers and household contacts since 2004
(11–13). Moreover, our findings suggest that asympto-
matic and mild H5N1 virus infections had not occurred in
the population we investigated. Although H5N1 virus was
only isolated from birds in 1 household, evidence suggest-
ed an H5N1 outbreak among numerous chicken flocks in
the village beginning ≈6 weeks before the human H5N1
case was confirmed. Given that direct contact with poultry
and poultry products was common among people in this
village, a high proportion of villagers were presumably
exposed to H5N1 virus. Genetic analysis of H5N1 virus
isolates from the infected farmer and 2 chickens confirmed
that no reassortment with elements of human influenza A
viral genome had occurred (2). We cannot say why illness
developed in 1 person when family, neighbors, and many
other villagers who reported similar poultry exposures did
not have any evidence of H5N1 virus infection.
The seroprevalence of H5N1 antibody in the
Cambodian population surveyed was substantially lower
than was found in poultry workers in Hong Kong in 1997
with the same microneutralization assay (13). Although
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Figure 2. Infected flocks detected by week of reporting period,
January 1–March 26, 2005, southern Cambodia. Cluster refers to
households within the circle on Figure 1.this assay is a highly specific and strain-dependent test
and may not detect neutralizing antibody to antigenically
distinct H5N1 virus strains, the 2004 Vietnam clade 1
H5N1 virus strain used in our investigation was antigeni-
cally identical and genetically similar to H5N1 viruses
circulating among poultry in Cambodia in 2005 (2).
Nonetheless, a small chance exists that previous H5N1
virus infection might have been missed if levels of H5N1
neutralizing antibodies had declined; for example, some
human influenza virus infections do not invariably result
in a detectable serum antibody response (14). However,
the kinetics of the H5N1 antibody response in humans is
similar to that of human influenza A virus (15). In addi-
tion, recent evidence shows that the H5N1 virus results in
a systemic infection likely to produce a neutralizing anti-
body response (16,17). When these results are considered
with our findings from a sample of >350 people, H5N1
virus infection was not likely to have occurred without
any circulating immunoglobulin G, even 2 months after
symptom onset. H5N1 virus transmission to humans may
be rare because it only occurs in exposed persons with
unique host susceptibilities and a predisposition to an
abnormal inflammatory response that results in severe and
fatal outcomes, rather than causing a broad spectrum of
illness with mild disease and subclinical infections.
Nevertheless, further research is needed to better under-
stand the immune response to H5N1 virus infection in
humans.
Our investigations also found that some animal-han-
dling practices, such as handling poultry, cleaning poultry
stalls and cages, and collecting poultry feathers appeared
to reduce the chance that a flock would be infected by
H5N1 virus. This finding is in contrast to findings that han-
dling dead or sick poultry is a risk factor for (individual)
human H5N1 illness (18,19). We speculate that some prac-
tices that encourage backyard birds to stay close to the
house, such as handling poultry, may be protective by
reducing the distance healthy fowl need to roam to forage
for food, thereby reducing interactions with wild and other
domestic birds and contact with contaminated environ-
ments. Cleaning poultry stalls and cages and collecting
poultry feathers may indicate a better level of general
hygiene practices and may also decrease the risk by
removing potentially infectious materials. These findings
may highlight the value of educating farmers about
hygienic animal-handling practices.
Other behavior appeared to modify the risk for H5N1 in
domestic fowl. Purchasing live poultry increased risk. The
introduction of new birds that may be harboring disease is
an obvious threat to a flock. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that farmers in Kampot Province had responded to the
culling without compensation control measures by
attempting to sell birds at the first sign of sickness during
outbreaks in 2005 (World Health Organization, unpub.
data). Additionally, poultry trade with Vietnamese farmers
was common and persisted despite the introduction of laws
prohibiting such cross-border trafficking. Southern
Vietnam has, like Cambodia, experienced mass H5N1 out-
breaks among domestic fowl in the last few years (World
Health Organization, unpub. data), and the village exam-
ined in this survey was 20 km from the border.
Our results need to be interpreted in the context of sev-
eral limitations. The interview process involved a recall
period of 12 months and did not document more temporal-
ly relevant exposures immediately before or during the
outbreak. The long recall period may increase the proba-
bility of exposure to potential risk factors, making house-
holds with and without suspected H5N1 virus infection in
flocks more similar. In addition, the temporal association
between behavioral risk factors and H5N1 virus infection
in poultry was difficult to establish. On the basis of our
counterintuitive findings, further risk factor studies should
address this potential bias. The classification of house-
holds as likely having H5N1 in their flocks was based on
a case definition suggested by Food and Agriculture
Organization veterinarians. Without confirmation of H5N1
virus infection, we do not know the sensitivity and speci-
ficity of this definition and cannot quantify the degree of
misclassification, if any. The study did not collect informa-
tion about the origins of each flock, how long birds had
belonged to each household, or internal movements of
individual birds and flocks within the village. This limita-
tion hindered mapping the likely circulation of H5N1 virus
among poultry in the village, and other factors related to
poultry transmission may have been missed. Although we
did not record and map households we did not visit, this
bias is likely to have been nondifferential because the pro-
portions of nonvisited households were similar for all 4
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investigation teams that surveyed in 4 different directions.
Finally, specimen collection had limitations. Higher con-
centrations of virus exist in the trachea of infected birds
rather than in the cloacae (20), but tracheal sampling was
not performed in this survey because it was not acceptable
to local farmers.
This study provides evidence of the low transmissibili-
ty of the H5N1 virus from infected poultry to humans,
even in circumstances in which human-poultry interac-
tions are regular and intense. In this instance, human H5N1
virus infection manifested as a single case of severe illness
without any evidence that the virus could cause either mild
disease or asymptomatic infection. However, our findings
are limited to the investigation period of 2005. As H5N1
viruses continue to circulate and evolve among poultry,
poultry-to-human transmission of H5N1 viruses could
increase. Extensive investigations should be routinely con-
ducted for all H5N1 outbreaks among humans and animals
to monitor the nature and extent of bird-to-human or
human-to-human transmission of H5N1 viruses.
Additional seroepidemiologic investigations should be
conducted to assess the ongoing risk for bird-to-human
transmission of H5N1 among rural and other human pop-
ulations.
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